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In Defense of the Agent and Patient Distinction:  
The Case from Molecular Biology and Chemistry  
 
Philosophers, tracing back to Aristotle, traditionally distinguished between agents and patients in 
causal interactions.  Agents interact with patients and patients suffer change as a result.  
Recently, many philosophers have challenged the agent/patient distinction, arguing instead that 
causal interactions are symmetrical, consisting in mutually interacting entities.  Hence, they also 
argue that there is no principled basis for the agent/patient distinction. 
In this paper, I defend the distinction.  I do so by arguing that there is a widespread type 
of causal interaction between distinct entities where an asymmetry results due to the interaction, 
providing principled grounds for the agent/patient distinction.  The type of interaction is when 
one of the two (or more) interacting entities undergoes a change in its kind membership, 
structure, causal powers, or intrinsic properties as a result of the interaction, while the other does 
not.  There are many examples of this type of interaction in molecular biology and chemistry.  I 
focus specifically on (i) the actions of enzymes on substrates and (ii) H2O molecules breaking 
polarized molecules’ bonds.   
After giving a brief overview of previous and historically important accounts of the 
agent/patient distinction, I present the critics’ arguments.  I then turn to the positive case, arguing 
that there are many interactions resulting in an asymmetry that provides a principled basis for 
distinguishing agents from patients.  Finally, I lay out and to a limited extent defend several 
commitments of my account and respond to objections.   
 
Part 1 Agent and Patient Distinction Overview 
I’ll start with an initial characterization of previous accounts of the agent/patient distinction 
before turning to criticisms of it in Part 2.  I’ll then defend a nuanced version of the distinction in 
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Parts 3 and 4.  I note that the account I defend, while informed by earlier accounts, ultimately 
follows the spirit rather than the precise letter of the accounts I briefly present in Part 2.1   
I’ll start by presenting criteria for some entity to be a patient in a causal interaction.  Take 
a sculptor molding clay.  In this interaction, clay is the patient for two reasons.  First, the clay is 
what ultimately changes in the interaction.  Second, the clay changes because of its interaction 
with another entity, the sculptor.  The first reason is distinct from the second because there are 
entities that spontaneously change rather than changing because of their interactions with other 
entities.  For example, in beta decay, a neutron spontaneously changes into a proton and emits an 
electron and a neutrino.  While beta decay is a change, it isn’t a change due to the neutron’s 
interacting with another entity.  So a key criterion of an entity being a patient is that it changes as 
a result of interacting with another entity.  This has historically been phrased in several different 
ways:  The patient receives a change or the patient suffers change.    
The agent can be understood in light of the patient.  The agent is the entity that interacts 
with the patient and as a result of the interaction, the patient changes.  When sculpting clay, the 
sculptor is the agent, the entity that changes the clay by molding the clay.  In this sense, the agent 
is what acts on the patient, while the patient—the clay—is what receives the change in shape.   
Traditional accounts of the agent/patient distinction also distinguished between active and 
passive powers.  As we shall see in the next section, most critics of the agent/patient distinction 
are powers realists.  Yet they deny both the agent/patient and the active/passive power 
distinctions.   
According to Aristotle, a power in general is a source of change.  An active power is a 
source of change in something other than the thing changed (Metaphysics Book IX Ch 1, 
 
1 See, for example, Aristotle, Metaphysics Book IX Ch. 1 1045b28-1046a35 and Meterology Book IV Parts 4-9; 
Aquinas ST, 1a q25 a1c; and Locke, ECHU, 1.21.2 and 1.21.72. 
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1045b28-1046a35).  Specifically, the active power is the power exercised by the agent on the 
patient, when interacting with the patient (ibid).  The active power is the feature of the agent that 
accounts for why it is able to produce a change in a patient (ibid).  A passive power is a feature 
of the patient that accounts for why the patient is able to be changed in the way it is changed by 
the agent.  Hot and wet clay can be molded but not shattered by a sculptor.  Hardened clay can be 
shattered but not molded.  Aristotle gives numerous examples of passive powers in his 
Meteorology, including:2 meltability3, hardenability4, thickenability5, solubility6, combustability7, 
impressionability8, and malleability.9 
Later figures such as Aquinas and Locke agreed with the broad contours of Aristotle’s 
characterization of agent/patient and active/passive power distinctions. According to Aquinas, an 
active power “is the principle of acting upon something else” while a passive power “is the 
principle of being acted upon by something else” (ST 1a q25 a1c).  Locke as well argued that 
“[p]ower, thus considered, is two-fold, viz. as able to make, or able to receive, any change: the 
one may be called active, and the other passive power” (ECHU 1.21.2).  The passive power, 
according to Locke, is the capacity to receive an impression from an external agent (ECHU 
1.21.72), which is tantamount to claiming that the passive power accounts for the patient’s 
ability to be changed by or acted on by an external agent.10 
To summarize this brief survey of others’ accounts of the agent/patient and active/passive 
 
2 According to Aristotle, the passive powers of bodies account in part for their nature and kind membership, 
differentiating them from one another. See Metereology Book IV, Ch. 8, 385a1-20. 
3 Ibid Ch. 4, 381b26-28. 
4 Ibid Ch. 6, 382b28-383b17. 
5 Ibid Ch. 7, 383b19-384a2. 
6 Ibid Ch. 7, 384a34-384b14. 
7 Ibid Ch. 7, 384b15-16. 
8 Ibid Ch. 9, 386a18-29. 
9 Ibid Ch. 9, 386b18-26. 
10 See also R.M. Harre (1970:87) and E.J. Lowe (2013: 159). 
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power distinctions, I draw attention to two important similarities between active and passive 
powers.  First, both kinds of powers are sources of change.  Both a metal wire’s bendability (a 
property a bowling ball lacks) and a human’s ability to bend a wire are sources of the change that 
the wire undergoes when bent.  Second, both kinds of powers can exist without being 
manifested.  A wire is bendable even when not bent and a human can bend a wire even when not 
bending. 
Nonetheless, there are differences between the two types of powers, which point to 
important differences between agents and patients.  An agent is the entity producing a change in 
a distinct entity in a causal interaction.  The patient is the entity that changes when interacting 
with the agent.  An active power is a power of an agent to produce the change in a patient.  A 
passive power is the property of the patient that accounts for why it changes in the specific way it 
changes when interacting with the agent.  When the human bends the wire, the human is the 
agent and the wire is the patient.  The wire is what is changed:  At the end of the interaction, the 
wire has a different shape, a shape that the wire by itself doesn’t have the ability to change.  The 
human’s power to bend the wire is an active power while the wire’s bendability is a passive 
power.  A weak human wouldn’t have the power to bend the wire.  A concrete pipe doesn’t have 
the passive power to be bent by a human.11   
 
Part 2 The Rejection of the Agent/Patient Distinction 
Recently, many philosophers have explicitly rejected the agent/patient and active/passive power 
distinctions. For example, C.B. Martin has argued that the “power to give versus the power to 
receive,” “agent versus patient,” and “active versus passive” distinctions are all “unhelpful 
 
11 I note that Aristotle, Aquinas, and Locke took activity and passivity to be intrinsic features of powers.  In the 
account I defend in Parts 3 and 4, activity and passivity are objective roles that powers play. 
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distinctions” (1993: 182). R.D. Ingthorsson similarly argues that causal production doesn’t 
consist in “an action of an ‘agent’ upon a ‘patient’” (2003: 4). Any asymmetry alleged in a causal 
interaction, such as the asymmetry between agents and patients, is “purely subjective” (2003: 18-
19). John Heil argues that the agent/patient and active/passive power distinctions are an 
inappropriate “byproduct of our explanatory practices and contingencies of experimental 
manipulation” (2012: 74).  Tobias Hannson-Wahlberg argues that a distinction between active 
and passive powers is “unnecessary and hence uneconomical” (2019: 1606).  Stephen Mumford 
and Rani Lill Anjum also argue that there is “no solid reason why we should privilege one of 
these two partners and depict it as the active partner” (2018: 269). Nor can they find a good 
reason for “relegating the other partner to a passive supporting role” (Ibid). Furthermore, there is 
no principled basis to say that one entity “plays the active role with the other passive” (2018: 
269).  
Before looking at their critiques of the agent/patient and active/passive power 
distinctions, it’s important to note that there are number of similarities between these 
philosophers views on causation and powers and those who affirm the distinctions. Both agree 
that powers are irreducible to other entities, such as categorical properties. Both agree that 
powers can exist unmanifested. So, to see why they reject the distinctions, it’s crucial to see how 
they understand the role of powers in causation. According to the distinction’s critics, causation 
consists in “constellations” or “power nets” of reciprocal, symmetrical, mutually manifesting 
partner powers.  
To clarify what is meant, take the attraction between a proton and an electron, such as in 
a hydrogen atom.  A proton and electron are attracted to each other because of the proton’s 
positive charge and the electron’s negative charge. The charges are the partner powers in this 
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interaction. Neither the proton’s positive charge nor the electron’s negative charge is alone 
adequate for the attraction between the two particles. Instead, both powers are required. Given 
that the proton and electron are attracted to each other because of their opposite charges, the two 
particles interact. The proton doesn’t simply act on the electron as agent to patient, as if the 
proton pulls the electron to it, for the electron pulls the proton as well. Both pull each other 
together. The proton’s and electron’s attraction to each other is the mutual manifestation of their 
positive and negative charges, respectively. The attraction is further reciprocal and symmetrical. 
The proton attracts the electron and the electron attracts the proton.  To the extent that the proton 
attracts the electron, the electron attracts the proton.  
In this example, there is no principled basis to single out one of the two entities as agent 
and the other as patient. There is also no principled basis to single out one power (e.g., the 
positive charge) as active and the other power (e.g., the negative charge) as passive. Instead, both 
entities act on each other and they do so because of their charges.   
Critics of the agent/patient and active/passive power distinctions claim that these sorts of 
situations, where there is no principled basis to single out an entity as an agent or a patient, are 
not rare. Instead, according to Heil, “they are by far the most common species of causal 
interaction” (Heil 2012: 119). As Ingthorsson points out, this isn’t a new idea nor is it distinctive 
to recent causal powers realists. It is found, for example, in classical mechanics, where 
“interactions between material bodies are reciprocal” and “with respect to forces quantitatively 
equal” (Ingthorsson 2002: 5).12 This extends to examples beyond the attraction of bodies due to 
their opposite charges or the gravitational pull of their masses. Even salt’s being dissolved in 
 
12 Ingthorsson appeals to Newton’s third law, which states that the forces between two interacting bodies are 
quantitatively equal (even though opposite in direction). See Ingthorsson (2002: 12).  See also Bunge (1959/2009: 
170-171). 
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water, according to Heil, “is the outcome of a causal process, a causing, that is itself 
symmetrical” (Heil 2012: 119). In all these examples, there is a reciprocal interaction of mutually 
manifesting partner powers.13  In Parts 3 and 4, I challenge the contention that there are no 
principled reasons to distinguish agents from patients, in part by pointing to several examples of 
other types of widespread causal interactions.   
2.1 What’s at Stake? 
If critics of the agent/patient distinction are right, then there are no principled ontological 
grounds for the distinction. That is, in causal interactions, there isn’t any sort of ontological 
asymmetry that indicates a genuine distinction between agents and patients.   
Before turning to my defense, it’s important to address what’s at stake.  First, the 
agent/patient distinction underlies much of our language.  Predicates such as “bendable” or 
“malleable” are assumed to be predicated of entities that suffer change when interacting with 
other entities with certain properties.  A theory of causation that denies that there are principled 
grounds for the distinction then incurs a cost.  For if there are principled reasons for the 
agent/patient distinction, then there’s an explanation for why language is rife with the distinction, 
both in grammar (e.g., active and passive voice) as well as the meanings of terms like “bendable” 
and “malleable”.   
I note that I am not arguing that there being principled grounds for the agent/patient 
distinction is necessary for explaining why the distinction is laden throughout language.  I also 
do not claim that human language carves reality at the joints or that ontology can always be read 
off the surface features of language.  Instead, I argue that a metaphysics which posits the 
distinction has an advantage over one which denies it, as the metaphysics that posits the 
 
13 Martin distinguishes reciprocity from symmetry and denies that symmetry is required for reciprocity. See Martin 
(1993: 185). 
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distinction can better explain why the distinction is laden throughout language.   
Additionally, as Anna Marmodoro has argued, the distinction can ground the direction of 
causation and do so in a way that is consistent with cases of simultaneous causation, an 
advantage lacking in theories of causation that ground the direction of causation on the direction 
of time.14  I note that in this paper, my primary aim is not to defend the direction of causation.  
Instead, I aim to defend the thesis that there are principled grounds for the distinction in a 
widespread type of interaction.  Yet this distinction can further defend causation’s direction.   
Lastly, as I address in greater depth soon, the agent/patient distinction underlies some 
crucial concepts in chemistry and biology, such as chemical catalysis.  I turn now to this point. 
 
Part 3 A Principled Way to Distinguish Agents from Patients 
In what follows, I argue that there are principled ontological grounds for the agent/patient 
distinction in a widespread type of interaction.  As discussed in Part 2, critics of the distinction 
base their case on the symmetries found in the interactions between subatomic particles or 
expressed by classical mechanical laws.  However, when one looks at many interactions in 
molecular biology and chemistry, there is an asymmetry that provide grounds for the distinction 
in a way that satisfy the broad contours of earlier accounts of it, as I shall argue.   
The type of interaction where I argue that there is a principled basis to distinguish agents 
from patients can be characterized thus:  An entity is a patient in an interaction when the entity 
suffers a change in its kind, structure, causal powers, or intrinsic properties, as a result of the 
interaction.  An entity is the agent in the same interaction when it does not suffer a change in its 
kind, structure, causal powers, or intrinsic properties, at the end of the interaction.  Instead, the 
 
14 Marmodoro has defended this point in several publications.  See Marmodoro (2014) and (2017). 
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agent entity at the end of the interaction persists in its kind, structure, causal powers, or intrinsic 
properties.  Importantly, as I shall show, interactions of this type are widespread in chemistry and 
molecular biology.   
Before turning to examples, it’s crucial that I clarify several points about the account of 
the distinction I defend.  First, in this paper, I am presenting a sufficient condition for the 
agent/patient distinction, rather than necessary and sufficient conditions.  My account is 
consistent with there being other types of interactions where there are principled reasons to 
distinguish agents from patients, such as interactions where both entities undergo a change in 
kind, structure, powers, or intrinsic properties, but they change in different respects.15  Examples 
include oxidation/reduction reactions and acid/base neutralization reactions.  In this paper, 
however, I’ll focus on the account I’ve canvassed above where one entity persists in kind, 
structure, powers, or intrinsic properties while the other does not.   
Second, according to what I argue is a sufficient condition for the distinction, agency and 
patiency are roles that entities take on, depending on the other entities interacted with.16 An 
entity that is an agent in one type of interaction may be a patient in a different type of interaction.  
Likewise, powers play either active or passive roles, depending on the type of interaction. In 
some interactions, a power may be responsible for a change in a distinct entity other than the 
power’s bearer. In other interactions, the same power is responsible for a change in its own 
bearer. This is both consistent with and influenced by earlier accounts. For example, according to 
Locke, a passive power is what makes its bearer “able to receive” a change or “receive an 
impression” from a distinct entity. The passive power then is what accounts for why an entity is 
changed when interacting with a distinct entity. That same power might play an active role in an 
 
15 See Marmodoro (2017: 72-73) and (2020: 63). 
16 Marmodoro similarly argues that activity and passivity are roles.  See, for example, (2017: 74). 
UNOFFICIAL VERSION.  PLEASE CITE OFFICAL VERSION. 10 
interaction with a different kind of entity.17 
However, while agency and patiency are roles rather than intrinsic features of entities, 
they are nonetheless objective roles that the entities play and which are grounded in part in their 
intrinsic features, such as their powers, as well as the intrinsic properties of the entity interacted 
with.  So while agency and patiency are roles, it does not follow that the distinction is 
unprincipled or subjective.  It isn’t subjective that an entity suffers change as a result of an 
interaction with a distinct entity while the other entity doesn’t change.  This is consistent with 
Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s accounts, who held that there are no pure agents or patients, except in 
limit cases such as God, the unmoved mover, and prime matter.18  I respond to this objection in 
greater depth in Part 4.   
Finally, I note that my account is indebted to Marmodoro’s and should be considered as 
an expansion upon and further development of her account.19  My paper builds on Marmodoro’s 
work in several respects.  First, in Part 4.3, I respond in greater depth to an objection that given 
that agency and patiency are roles, a view of both Marmodoro’s account and mine, the 
distinction is subjective.  Second, in Part 4.4, I respond to a related objection that given that 
agency and patiency are roles, the distinction adds nothing to ontology.  Third, in Part 4.1, I 
respond to an objection from reductionists that threatens a key example of both Marmodoro’s 
account and mine— water’s dissolving salt, by defending in some detail that H2O and NaCl 
molecules are strongly emergent entities with emergent powers.  Fourth, in Part 4, I also clarify 
and to a limited extent defend some another commitment of our accounts—  realism about 
chemical and molecular kinds.  Fifth, I develop a significant portion of my account by drawing 
 
17 Although my account is consistent with some purely passive powers, I won’t argue for their existence in this 
paper.   
18 See, for example, Aristotle, Physics, 202a5-7.  See also Marmodoro (2014:41) and Harre and Madden (1975: 89). 
19 See Marmodoro (2014), (2017), and (2020). 
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on an example of a widespread interaction from molecular biology that has until now not been 
considered in the debate on the agent/patient distinction by Marmodoro or others but which 
could help “tip the scales” in favor of the distinction— enzyme catalysis.  
3.1 Enzymes as Catalysts 
There are widespread examples of interactions that satisfy conditions that I argue are sufficient 
for some entity to be an agent, in that they do not change in their kind, structure, powers, or 
intrinsic properties while the entities they interact with in certain types of interactions do change 
and hence are patients.  I start with an example that has until now not been considered by 
philosophers in discussions about the agent/patient discussion, nor in the broader literature on 
causation and causal powers.  Specifically, I want to draw attention to entities that behave as 
catalysts in chemical and biochemical reactions.  Catalysts are entities that change the speeds of 
chemical reactions without themselves being consumed by or undergoing any permanent 
chemical change in the process (Alberts G:6; Brown G:2).  Furthermore, catalysts are very 
common and are key to many biological, atmospheric, and oceanic reactions (Brown 605).  In 
this paper, I focus primarily on the actions of enzymes (biochemical catalysts) on substrates.  In 
these interactions, enzymes play the agent role and substrates play the patient role:  The substrate 
undergoes a kind-change, while the enzyme persists.  The example of enzymes also introduces a 
new kind of support for the agent/patient distinction not available to other frequently discussed 
examples (e.g, water-solubility):  In Part 4.2.1, I provide evidence that the naturalistic biological 
function of enzymes is to behave as agents when interacting with substrates.   
As catalysts, enzymes speed up chemical reactions without being consumed by the 
reaction (Reece et al 2011: 83). Enzymes do so by contorting substrate molecules into highly 
unstable states. This results in either broken bonds (in anabolic reactions where one substrate is 
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broken into two products) or a newly formed bond (in catabolic reactions where two substrata 
are combined into one product) (Reece et al 2011: 84).  I’ll focus on anabolic reactions. 
While many reactions where one reactant is broken up into two products could happen 
spontaneously, the rate they occur without a catalyst is too slow for a cell’s survival and other 
crucial biological processes.20 With enzymes, however, crucial reactions occur at much higher 
rates, ensuring a cell’s survival. For example, sucrose (table sugar) in water can spontaneously 
hydrolyze, resulting in the products glucose and sucrose, but the process takes years. If the 
enzyme sucrase is added to water, however, the sucrose hydrolyzes in mere seconds.  
How then do enzymes speed up the necessary reactions for cellular processes? The 
answer lies in their shape and charge-distributions. Enzymes are complex macromolecules, 
usually proteins, with a unique three-dimensional shape. The specific shape determines what 
reactants or substrates the enzyme can act on. The enzyme does so through its active site, a 
groove on the enzyme’s surface that fits only some substrate molecules (Reece et al 2011: 84).  
The enzyme’s active site starts out empty, which the substrate attaches to via weak 
chemical bonds. Once attached, the enzyme’s active site changes shape slightly, fitting the 
substrate more tightly, in an induced fit. The induced fit contorts the substrate’s bonds, straining 
them so that they are easily broken. The result is the substrate is broken into the products of the 
reaction, such as glucose and fructose resulting from sucrase acting on sucrose (Reece et al 2011: 
84). 
What’s key is that the enzyme persists through the reaction, returning to its initial state.  
While the enzyme undergoes some conformational changes during the interaction, it returns to its 
 
20 Given the amount of energy needed, the processes would be too slow for survival, as a great deal of energy needs 
to be absorbed to weaken the reactant molecules’ bonds enough to break (Reece et al 2011: 83). While adding heat 
could speed up the reactions without requiring enzymes, the quantities of heat needed for the activation energy kill 
the cell.  (Ibid; Alberts 73).   
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initial state at the end of the process.  This is analogous to someone crushing a soda can by 
clenching their fists.  The enzyme retains the same shape, powers, and kind membership, 
allowing it to act on another substrate.21 The products of the interaction, however, are vastly 
different in kind, shape, mass, charges, and powers than the substrate. That is, the substrate does 
not persist.  
So when enzymes and substrates interact, there is an ontological asymmetry:  The 
enzymes persist while the substrates do not.22  The substrates suffer a kind-change from their 
interaction with enzymes.  Hence, in these interactions, enzymes are agents while substrates are 
patients.   
As stated above, agent and patient are roles such entities play in certain types of 
interactions. Enzymes can play the patient role in other interactions. For example, temperature 
and pH can permanently alter an enzyme’s shape (Reece et al 2011: 84). A noncompetitive 
inhibitor can bind to an allosteric site on the enzyme (a different place than the active site) and 
alter the enzyme’s shape so that it cannot act on substrates (Reece et al 2011: 85). Yet it’s worth 
repeating that traditional accounts of the agent/patient distinction also held that agents can be 
patients, except in limit cases, such as God or the unmoved mover.  
Furthermore, the enzyme’s and substrate’s shape and charge-distribution play the active 
and passive power roles, respectively. When interacting with the enzyme, the substrate’s shape 
and charge-distribution accounts for why it suffers a kind-change and the enzyme’s shape and 
 
21 As Daniel Nicholson notes, while recent advances in molecular biology show that some cellular functions are 
carried out by proteins that lack a stable structure and change when binding to targets, enzyme catalysis requires that 
enzymes have a clearly-defined three-dimensional structure (Nicholson 2019: 114).   
22 In this section, I use the biochemical rather than Aristotelian meaning of the terms “substratum” and “substrata” 
when discussing enzyme catalysis.  The substratum is the entity converted into chemical products by the enzyme (in 
anabolic reactions).  Of course, the two meanings are similar, as the Aristotelian meaning likely influenced the 
biochemical meaning.   
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charge-distribution accounts for why it changes the substrate. In other cases, the substrate’s 
shape and charge-distribution may play an active power role.  
3.2 Water Solubility 
The other example of this type of interaction I consider is from chemistry: water dissolving salt. I 
present this example because it is used as a frequent example of the agent/patient distinction but 
also is used in arguments against the distinction.  Lowe (2013 :159), for example, has argued that 
when water dissolves salt, water is the agent and salt is the patient. Yet according to Heil, a critic 
of the distinction, when water dissolves salt:  
“[T]his interaction is, or appears to be, continuous, not sequential; it is, or appears to be, 
symmetrical. Both the salt and the water work in concert to yield a certain result: the 
salt’s being dissolved in water” (2012: 118-19).  
 
Furthermore, Heil argues that “salt and water possess reciprocal powers or dispositions. The 
salt’s dissolving is a mutual manifestation of these dispositions” (2012: 118-19). Hence, Heil 
rejects the view that water is the agent and salt the patient or vice versa. Mumford and Anjum 
likewise argue: 
There seems to be no solid reason why we should privilege one of these two partners and 
depict it as the active partner—the trigger or stimulus—while relegating the other partner 
to a passive supporting role.  There seems to be no ontologically serious difference 
between the positions of the sugar and the liquid.” (2018: 269) 
 
However, as Marmodoro has pointed out, when one looks closer— specifically at the molecular 
rather than macroscopic level, there are indeed principled reasons to hold that individual H20 
molecules are agents while sodium chloride molecules (NaCl) are patients.  Marmodoro writes, 
“In the causal interaction of water and salt, polarized water molecules break the bond between 
the negative chloride ions and the positive sodium ions; whereas salt does not break the water 
molecules” (2017:73).   
In what follows, I describe water’s dissolving salt with far greater detail than has been 
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given before when used as an example of the agent/patient distinction and when the distinction’s 
critics target it.  Water’s power as a solvent is a frequent example in discussions of the 
distinction, so it’s worth pursuing an in depth look at the chemical details.  As I’ll show, a 
detailed examination of water dissolving salt at the molecular and chemical level satisfies the 
sufficient condition for the agent/patient condition defended in this paper.  I also return to the 
example of water dissolving salt in section 4.1, where I look at even more chemical and 
molecular features of it, when responding to a reductionist objection.   
At the molecular level, H2O molecules break the bonds of NaCl molecules, splitting  
NaCl molecules into Na+ and Cl- ions while H2O molecules remain intact (Brown 2009: 529). 
H2O is a polar molecule, with the oxygen end having a slight negative charge due to oxygen’s 
high electronegativity while the hydrogen ends have slight positive charges (Brown 2009: 354). 
The oxygen and hydrogen atoms are also covalently bonded to each other, the strongest type of 
chemical bond. NaCl (table salt) results from weaker ionic bonds between sodium and chlorine. 
A sodium atom gives its valence electron to a chlorine atom, so both atoms become stable, 
resulting in a positively charged sodium cation Na+ and a negatively charged chlorine anion Cl-. 
In virtue of their opposite charges, the Na+ and Cl- ionically bond to each other as a sodium 
chloride molecule (Brown 2009: 209-302). 
When H2O molecules surround a NaCl molecule, the H2O molecules pull apart the 
NaCl’s bonds. Specifically, water molecule’s negative oxygen end attracts the positive Na+ while 
the water molecule’s positive hydrogen end attracts the negative Cl-. Given that NaCl is formed 
by a weak ionic bond while H2O is formed by stronger covalent bonds, the NaCl separates into 
Na+ and Cl- ions, which then move freely apart from each other (Brown 2009: 528-29). 
So when H2O molecules interact with NaCl molecules, the H2O molecules remain intact. 
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They do not change in kind; instead they persist. The NaCl molecules, however, do not persist. 
Instead, they change kind.  In this respect, the interaction is asymmetrical.  Therefore, I argue 
that when interacting, H2O molecules are agents while NaCl molecules are patients, on the 
criteria of the agent/patient distinction in this paper. Additionally, the polarity of the H2O 
molecule plays the active power role while the NaCl’s ionic bonds play the passive power role. 
The ionic bonds accounts for why NaCl suffers a kind change when interacting with H2O.  
 
Part 4 Objections and Replies 
In this section, I respond to several objections to my account of the agent/patient distinction: a 
reducibility objection and several variants of an objection that the agent/patient distinction is 
subjective.  In responding, I also make explicit assumptions that until this point were implicit: 
there are emergent entities and powers, there are chemical and molecular kinds, and there are 
biological functions.  I note that I cannot give a full defense of these assumptions here.  
Nonetheless, the assumptions are plausible and are held by many philosophers, chemists, and 
biologists.  Importantly, as I’ll show, some critics of the agent/patient distinction also defend 
some of these assumptions.  Regardless, my overall argument here is a conditional: Given my 
assumptions, there is a principled way to distinguish agents from patients in many interactions.   
4.1 Assumption: Emergent Entities and Powers  
The first assumption is that there are emergent entities with emergent powers.  Specifically, I 
assume that molecules such as H2O and macromolecules such as enzymes are emergent entities 
with novel causal powers that are not reducible to their constituent atomic or subatomic particles’ 
powers.  I present this assumption because some critics of the agent/patient distinction also favor 
reductive ontologies, such as Heil (2012).  A reductionist objection can be expressed thus:   
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Interactions between atoms, molecules, and macromolecules are reducible to interactions 
between subatomic particles.  Yet interactions between subatomic particles are 
symmetrical.  E.g., when two electrons repel each other, there is no reason to favor one as 
the agent and the other as the patient.  The repulsion is mutual.  Given that interactions 
between subatomic particles are symmetrical and interactions between higher level 
entities such as molecules are reducible to interactions between subatomic particles, 
interactions between higher level entities are ultimately symmetrical as well.  There may 
be pragmatic reasons, but no ontological reasons to label one entity as agent and the other 
as patient. 
 
Furthermore, in response to my argument that when one entity suffers a change in kind, 
structure, powers, or intrinsic properties, while the other does not, the former is a patient and the 
latter is an agent, the reductionist may argue:  
In the examples of higher-level entities (e.g., water molecules) used to argue for a 
principled agent/patient distinction, while the alleged higher-level entities do not persist, 
their lower-level subatomic constituents do persist. As higher-level entities and the 
interactions between such entities are reducible to subatomic particles and their 
symmetrical interactions, there are no principled ontological reasons to label some 
subatomic entities as agents and others as patients.  
 
In response, I note first that I will not challenge the inference that if the interactions between 
higher-level molecules are reducible to interactions between subatomic particles, then there are 
no principled ontological reasons to distinguish agents from patients in these interactions. 
However, there are reasons to dispute the reducibility of molecules to subatomic particles as well 
as the interactions between molecules to interactions between subatomic particles. I note that I 
cannot offer a full defense of their irreducibility in this paper. Others have already done so (see, 
for instance, Bogaard 1978, Scerri 1997, and Hendry 2017).23   
Nonetheless, there are plausible reasons to hold that the higher level entities’ powers in at 
least one of my examples are not reducible to their subatomic constituents’ powers.  I’ll focus 
 
23 For example, Hendry (2017: 153-4) notes that molecular kinds such as ethanol and dimethyul ether have the same 
Schrodinger equation but nonetheless different properties. Ethanol and dimethyul are isomers— molecules having 
the same atomic constituents but different shapes. The differing shapes result in different levels of solubility and 
boiling points.   
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specifically on H2O molecules’ powers. H2O molecules can break NaCl into Na+ and Cl- because 
H2O molecules can form hydrogen bonds.24  It’s especially worth focusing on this example, as 
water dissolving salt is a frequent example of the agent/patient distinction and a frequent target 
of the distinction’s critics.25  Additionally, as others argue, there is a plausible case that the 
power to form hydrogen bonds is an emergent power.26  
A water molecule’s charge, like its atomic constituents, is electrically neutral.  However, 
due to the oxygen atom’s higher electronegativity, a water molecules atomic constituents’ 
covalent bonds are polar. The polar covalent bond is responsible for the water molecule’s 
distinctive shape and uneven charge distribution. So while an H2O molecule as a whole is 
electrically neutral, the oxygen end is partially negative while the hydrogen ends are partially 
positive.  
Due to the shape and uneven charge—properties of the whole molecule rather than its 
atomic or subatomic constituents—the water molecule can form the hydrogen bonds used to 
break apart molecules like NaCl. That is, the power to form hydrogen bonds is a higher level 
property of water molecules.  
Moreover, isolated oxygen or hydrogen atoms do not have the power to form hydrogen 
bonds. It is also not a simple additive power, unlike the power of two individual ten pound bricks 
to push a scale’s pointer to a twenty pound mark, a power lacked by the individual bricks but 
nonetheless available to the combined bricks irrespective of their arrangement (aside from being 
on the scale). Instead, the oxygen and hydrogen atoms must be covalently bonded, resulting in a 
 
24 In a footnote discussing water dissolving salt, Marmodoro also claims that water and salt are genuine macro 
substances that have powers, but also states she is unable to give a full defense.  In this section, I offer the needed 
defense by presenting detailed reasons why water and salt molecules are emergent substances with emergent 
powers.  See Marmodoro (2017: 76, fn. 34). 
25 As we saw in section 3.2  
26 See, for example, Stump (2013). 
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charge redistribution, in order for the power to form hydrogen bonds to emerge.27 Two hydrogen 
atoms and one oxygen atom cannot break NaCl’s ionic bonds even if they interact with the NaCl 
molecule at the same time.  The hydrogen and oxygen must be covalently bonded.   
Notably, additional support for the assumption that H20, NaCl, and their powers are 
strongly emergent can be found from the arguments of two important critics of the agent/patient 
distinction, Mumford and Anjum.  They argue that H2O’s power is not reducible to its parts’ 
powers because the powers of the whole emerge from the interacting components, and the 
interacting components themselves are “changed by their causal participation in the whole” 
(2017: 98).  The change of the component parts, according to Mumford and Anjum, explain why 
the parts’ powers are not simply aggregated to confer higher level powers on the whole. Instead, 
“water, for example, has a power to put out fires, but neither of the components of water can put 
out fires; indeed, they would fuel them” (2017: 98-9). Additionally, “chlorine is a poisonous gas; 
sodium ignites spontaneously on water. But sodium chloride has neither of these causal powers. 
And it tastes salty, which none of its components do” (2017: 98-9).  So it is plausible to hold that 
molecules and macromolecules are not reducible their subatomic parts and it is also plausible to 
hold that interactions between such molecules are not reducible to interactions between their 
parts. Instead, they are emergent entities with emergent powers.  
4.2 Objection: Asymmetry is Subjective 
A second objection, which points to another assumption of my account, comes from 
Ingthorsson’s argument against the agent/patient distinction.  Ingthorssson argues that while we 
 
27 As both Stump (2013) and Mumford and Anjum (2018) argue, this account of emergence is consistent with 
physical causal closure, just not basal closure. Instead, it’s a variety of top-down causation. For example, when a 
water molecule moves due to its forming a hydrogen bond with NaCl, the whole water molecule—including its 
atomic constituents—moves, but the atomic constituents would not move unless the whole molecule moved due to 
the whole water molecule’s hydrogen bond with NaCl. 
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“often experience interactions as being asymmetrical”, the “experience of asymmetry is purely 
subjective” (2002: 18-19). Take a brick remaining intact after shattering a window. According to 
Ingthorsson: 
It does appear to be more ‘fatal’ for a window to be smashed to smithereens than for a 
brick to lose momentum. But, surely, the sense in which the breaking, or destruction of 
objects in general, is ‘fatal’, is a subjective evaluation. (2002: 18-19) 
 
Ingthorsson furthermore clarifies that “subjective” means “dependent on our explanatory 
interests” (2002: 18-19). 
In response, I note that Ingthorsson’s example of a brick shattering a window involves 
artifacts.  In the case of artifacts, Ingthorsson is perhaps correct that an interaction being “fatal” 
to one object (e.g., a window) while not fatal to another (e.g,. a brick) is subjective and 
dependent merely on our explanatory interests. 
However, the examples I’ve used are interactions where entities change their natural 
kind. If realism about atomic, chemical, and molecular kinds or at least microstructure is true, 
then it is not merely subjective that interactions between H2O and NaCl molecules are fatal for 
the NaCl molecules.28 The H2O molecules persist while the NaCl molecules genuinely do not. 
Instead, they change kind, into Na+ and Cl- ions.  Likewise for interactions between enzymes and 
substrates. So if there are natural kinds, specifically chemical and molecular kinds, then there is a 
fact of the matter when one entity changes in kind while the other when interacting.   
Of course, electromagnetic forces’ influences are symmetrical.  But that is consistent with 
a different sort of asymmetry that I’ve argued provides grounds for the agent/patient distinction: 
an asymmetry of persistence of interacting entities. That one entity persists while another does 
not in these interactions is a genuine ontological asymmetry. It is not subjective that enzymes 
 
28 I do not defend chemical and molecular kinds in this paper. For classical accounts, see Kripke (1980) and Putnam 
(1975). For a nuanced take, see Hendry (2015). 
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persist while substrates do not when interacting.29 Therefore, Ingthorsson’s argument does not 
challenge the criteria I’ve argued are sufficient for the agent/patient distinction. 
4.2.1 The Argument from Functions 
 
In the case of enzymes and substrates interacting, there is an additional reason to distinguish 
agents from patients and hence an additional response to Ingthorsson’s challenge.  According to 
biologists, when interacting with substrates, the two-fold biological function of enzymes is: (i) to 
change the substrate’s kind, resulting in products the cell needs that differ in kind from what the 
substrate was prior to interacting with the enzyme; while (ii) the enzyme persists, enabling it to 
change another substrate.  One finds (i) and (ii) in functional attribution statements in biology 
textbooks: 
Enzymes speed up reactions, often by a factor of a million or more, without themselves 
being changed—that is, they act as catalysts that permit cells to make or break covalent 
bonds in a controlled way.  It is the catalysis of organized sets of chemical reactions by 
enzymes that creates and maintains the cell, making life possible. (Alberts 159, emphasis 
added) 
 
The human body is characterized by an extremely complex system of interrelated 
chemical reactions.  All these reactions must occur at carefully controlled rates to 
maintain life.  A large number of marvelously efficient biological catalysts known as 
enzymes are necessary for many of these reactions to occur at suitable rates. (Brown 
608-9, emphasis added) 
 
As Marmodoro has argued, while agency, patiency, activity, and passivity are functional roles, 
the grounds for the roles are metaphysical (2017: 75).30  In this section, I show that Marmodoro’s 
thesis has strong support from a domain that has been given little to no consideration in 
discussions of the active/passive power distinction: biological functions.  Importantly, the 
 
29 As Marmodoro argues, various metaphysical differences between interacting entities can provide grounds for the 
asymmetry that can ground distinguishing agents from patients.  My paper presents two detailed examples of one 
such important and widespread metaphysical difference.  See Marmodoro (2017: 73) 
30 In the following two sections, I respond in depth to an objection that if agency and patiency are roles, the 
distinction is subjective. 
UNOFFICIAL VERSION.  PLEASE CITE OFFICAL VERSION. 22 
functional attributions of enzymes are consistent with naturalism, and enzymes have their 
functions independent of human interest.  I note that while philosophers of biology distinguish 
between two types of functional attributions: causal role attributions and selectionist attributions, 
most biologists do not explicitly clarify the sort of attribution being made and oftentimes blend 
both accounts.31  Nonetheless, there are plausible reasons to hold that enzymes function as 
agents, satisfying (i), (ii), or both (i) and (ii) on both causal role and selectionist accounts.  I’ll 
start with causal role accounts.   
On causal role accounts of function, an entity’s function is its contribution to the 
operation or capacity of the whole system of which it is a part.32  The entity’s function is the 
specific causal role within the larger system’s operation— how the entity enables the system to 
behave as it does.  The causal role account is then an instrumentalist account: the function of an 
entity E is its contribution to a capacity C of E’s containing system S.  E could also make a 
different contribution to a different capacity C’ of S or a different system S’.  For example, the 
heart’s circulatory system function is to pump blood.  The heart also makes thumping noises, 
which is a side effect with respect to its circulatory system role but is a function helpful for 
medical diagnosis.  As the causal role account of functions is instrumentalist, relative to some 
capacities, an entity might play the agent role.  With respect to other capacities, the same entity 
plays the patient role.  This does not challenge my account, as my account holds that agency and 
patiency are roles that entities play in some types of interactions.   
With respect to role (i), enzymes change substrate molecules’ kind, resulting in products 
the cell or body needs.  Take digestive enzymes: The digestive system’s capacity is to break 
down food into its chemical constituents without breaking down the organism itself (i.e., without 
 
31 For a general overview of biological functions, see Godfrey-Smith (2014) and Okasha (2019). 
32 For a recent defense of causal role accounts of functions, see Cummins and Roth (2010). 
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digesting one’s self).  Digestive enzymes contribute to that capacity.  With respect to role (ii), 
enzymes persist in their interactions with substrates and can break down further substrates upon 
releasing their products.  Enzymes contribute to the digestive system’s capacity to break down 
food without exhausting the organisms’ resources, as the same enzyme can break down many 
food molecules while itself persisting.   
A selectionist (or aetiological) functional attribution of an entity is equivalent to an 
explanation of why the entity was selected via natural selection to evolve as it did in the 
organism or cell.33  That is, an entity’s function is the effect of the entity favored by natural 
selection.  So a selectionist account of an entity’s function explains why the entity is there.  With 
respect to role (i), enzymes are selected because they bring about kind changes in certain 
substrates. By selected, I mean that organisms and cells with the genes for the enzyme survive 
and reproduce.  For example, organisms with enzymes that break down environmental toxins 
into harmless products are better fitted to their environment and more likely to be reproductively 
successful.  This also applies to gene expression in differentiated cells: cells express the genes 
for enzymes in only certain parts of an organism rather than others (e.g., digestive enzymes are 
expressed by stomach rather than lung cells). 
With respect to (ii), it’s crucial that enzymes persist when interacting with substrates.  If 
enzymes did not persist, then cells would constantly need to replenish the enzymes to get the 
products necessary for the cell.  While it is possible that macromolecules that interact with 
substrates also changed kind, needing to be replaced, that would be incredibly inefficient.  Cells 
with genes for macromolecules that persist in interactions with substrates that become products 
needed by the cell are more likely to persist and successfully reproduce cells with the same 
 
33 For defenses of selectionist (also known as ‘aetiological’) accounts of functions, see, for example, Godfrey-Smith 
(1994), Milikan (1984), Neander (1991), and Wright (1973).   
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genes.  So I argue that on both causal role and selectionist accounts of functions, there are 
principled reasons to hold that when interacting, enzymes are agents and substrates are patients.   
 
4.3 If Agency and Patiency are Roles then the Distinction is Subjective 
Here I address an objection similar to the one in 4.2, but which merits further consideration.  I 
express the objection thus: 
Given that agency and patiency are extrinsic roles that entities play, depending on the 
types of entities they interact with, the agent/patient distinction is a merely pragmatic or 
conventional distinction.  The agent/patient distinction does not reflect any ontic 
categories; it is not an ontological distinction.   
 
In response, I argue first that while agency and patiency are roles on my account, they are 
nonetheless objective and mind-independent roles that entities play, depending on the other 
entities interacted with.34  By objective and mind-independent, I mean that it is not the case that 
enzymes and water molecules, for example, persist while substrates and salt molecules do not 
because of the subjective or pragmatic explanatory interests of biologists and chemists.  It is a 
mind-independent fact that when enzymes interact with substrates, enzymes persist while 
substrates change kind.  Likewise, as Marmodoro has pointed out, it is a mind-independent fact 
that when water and salt molecules interact, water molecules break the salt molecules into Na+ 
and Cl- ions, while salt molecules do not break up water molecules (Marmodoro 2017: 73).   
Second, to press this point further, it’s important to clarify the term “role” in claiming 
that agency and patiency are roles, which has not been done yet.  I’ll start with what “role” does 
not mean.  Take an actor playing the role of a surgeon performing surgery on a show.  The actor, 
of course, is not really a surgeon and not really conducting surgery.  Instead, the actor is 
 
34 In this section, I defend at length a point originally made by Marmodoro, who argues “the grounds for allotting 
these roles are not epistemological but metaphysical” (2017: 75). 
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pretending.  This is not the notion of a role in my argument that agency and patiency are roles.  
In interactions where entities play the agent and patient roles, the patient actually changes while 
the agent actually persists.     
Take instead an assistant tasked with driving the actor to the set.  Unlike the actor playing 
the surgeon, when the assistant drives the actor, the assistant is not pretending.  We do not label 
the assistant “the driver” for pragmatic or conventional reasons.  The assistant actually drives the 
actor; the actor is actually driven.  This is closer to my account of agency and patiency as roles: 
the role is a function an entity assumes.  Enzymes, as shown in 4.2, function as agents when 
interacting with substrates.  Substrates change kind while enzymes persist, ready to change 
another substrate into a product.   
There is an important difference between the assistant driving the actor and 
enzyme/substrate and water/salt molecule examples, yet this difference bolsters my account.  The 
actor could just as well drive the assistant.  However, when enzymes with certain intrinsic 
properties interact with substrates with certain intrinsic properties, the substrates cannot break up 
the enzyme.  Likewise, salt molecules cannot break up water molecules.35   
Third, a reason that agency and patiency not being intrinsic properties does not entail that 
the distinction is subjective can be shown via two analogies, which until now have not been 
considered.  The first is with relations. Earth is closer to Venus than Mars.  Yet Earth’s being 
closer to Venus is not an intrinsic property.  That does not entail, however, that it’s merely 
pragmatic or conventional to hold that Earth is closer to Venus than Mars.  Likewise, agency and 
patiency being extrinsic roles rather than intrinsic features does not entail that they are merely 
pragmatic or conventional labels assigned to interacting entities rather than genuine roles. 
 
35 See also Marmodoro (2017: 73). 
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I note again an important difference between relations and agency and patiency, but it’s a 
difference that again strengthens my case.  Earth’s being closer to Venus than Mars is not 
dependent on the planets’ intrinsic properties.  However, agency and patiency, while extrinsic 
roles of interacting entities, are dependent on the entities’ intrinsic properties.   
The second analogy is more relevant to causation.  Take an electron’s negative charge, a 
power.  When electrons interact with like-charged particles, the charge is a repulsive power.  
When electrons interact with oppositely-charged particles, it’s an attractive power.  So, whether 
an electron’s charge is attractive or repulsive depends on both the intrinsic features of the charge 
but also the properties of the particles interacted with.  Hence, an electron’s charge being 
attractive or repulsive is an extrinsic role.  Nonetheless, an electron’s charge isn’t held to be 
attractive or repulsive for pragmatic or conventional reasons.  Electron’s really repel other 
electrons and really attract protons.   
Likewise, while agency and patiency are extrinsic roles, whether entities play those roles 
is dependent on the intrinsic properties of the interacting entities.  So I argue that if it’s not 
pragmatic or conventional to hold that particle charges are sometimes attractive and sometimes 
repulsive, depending on the charges of particles interacted with, then it’s not merely pragmatic or 
conventional to hold that sometimes entities play agent roles and sometimes they play patient 
roles, depending on the entities interacted with.   
4.4 The Distinction Adds Nothing to Ontology 
 
The final objection addressed can be expressed thus:  If no entities are intrinsically agents or 
patients and no powers are intrinsically active or passive, the distinctions add nothing to 
ontology.36  Hence, there’s no real substantive debate between my account and critics’ accounts.  
 
36 Compare to Aristotle, who in Categories Ch. iv and ix holds that active and passive belong to distinct categories 
of being.  Noted in Hansson-Wahlberg (2019: 7). 
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This is a new objection—raised by Hansson-Wahlberg—to accounts of the agent/patient 
distinction that hold that agency and patiency are roles, which has not yet been specifically 
responded to: 
Perhaps something like this view is in fact all that is intended by powers theorists 
ostensibly postulating active and passive powers. Perhaps they merely wanted to say that 
ontologically speaking there is only one kind, or category, of power: active causal power, 
i.e. power to bring about change. In a causal encounter, active causal powers of the 
objects involved come together in such a way that they cooperate to produce the 
manifestation effect. Linguistically, and conventionally, we call those active causal 
powers that happen to be situated in the object that undergoes intrinsic change (or the 
most intrinsic change) passive powers or liabilities. (2019: 6-7) 
 
As activity and passivity are roles rather than intrinsic features of entities or powers, the view 
does not, according to Hansson-Wahlberg, “involve a postulation of distinct kinds or categories 
of power” (2019: 7, fn 11).  I’ve already responded to the objection that if agency and patiency 
are extrinsic roles, then agency and patiency are merely linguistic or conventional labels.  Here, I 
address the similar objection that if agency and patiency are roles, there is—in the end—no 
difference between my account and the distinction’s critics’ accounts. 
In response, I note first that many targets of my account are critics’ claims (as shown in 
Part 2) that the agent/patient distinction is “unhelpful” (Martin 1993: 182), “purely subjective” 
(Ingthorsson 2003: 4), or that it has no “principled basis” (Mumford and Anjum 2018: 269).  
Even though I agree that agency and patiency are not intrinsic features of entities but rather 
extrinsic roles, I have nonetheless argued that there are objective and principled reasons to 
distinguish agents from patients in many interactions.     
Second, as already argued, while agency and patiency are not intrinsic features of entities, 
the intrinsic properties of interacting entities determine whether they are agents or patients in 
interactions.  So, metaphysics grounds the agent/patient distinction.  Aristotle and Aquinas 
similarly held that most entities can be both agents and patients, depending on what they interact 
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with.37  The only pure agent is God/the unmoved mover and the only pure patient is prime 
matter.    
Third, some of our best physical theories support the distinction.  Recall, for example, 
that the agent/patient distinction is laden in the notion of catalysis: catalysts are entities that 
cause reactions without themselves being consumed by the reactions.  If metaphysics should be 
rooted in our best physical theories and our best theories posit catalysts, then there is ontological 
support for the agent/patient distinction. Enzyme function provides similar support: a function of 
enzymes is to persist while changing substrates into products.  Of course, a devout reductionist 
who believes that only physics should inform our ontology would reject deriving metaphysical 
theses from chemistry and molecular biology, the domains where catalysts and the enzyme 
functions are found.  However, in 4.1, I presented reasons to reject such a reductionist ontology, 
a rejection shared by important critics of the agent/patient distinction.   
Conclusion 
In this paper, I argued that there is a principled basis for distinguishing agents from patients in 
many interactions.  Support stems from a widespread type of causal interaction, resulting in a 
type of ontological asymmetry that provides principled grounds for distinguishing agents from 
patients. The type of interaction where the asymmetry is found is when one of the entities 
changes in kind, structure, powers, or intrinsic properties while the other does not. Interactions of 
this type are abundant in chemistry and molecular biology.  Examples include the actions of 
enzymes on substrates and H2O molecules breaking the bonds of polarized molecules.  I then 
articulated and to a limited extend defended several commitments of my account:  emergent 
chemical and molecular entities and powers, chemical and molecular kinds, and that the 
 
37 See, for example, Aristotle, Physics 202a5-12. 
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agent/patient distinction is laden in functional attributions of enzymes.  If these assumptions are 
plausible, then it is also plausible to distinguish agents from patients in many interactions.  
Lastly, I responded to several variants of an objection that given that agency and patiency are 
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